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Introduction
The infamous Great Leap Famine in 1959 to 1962 is the worst famine in modern Chinese
history. The catastrophic famine caused gigantic causalities, estimated from 23 million to 46
million people.1 A professor from Hong Kong University of Science and technology, James Kaising Kung and a professor from Peking University, Justin Yifu Lin, argues that political
radicalism created the Great Leap Famine.2 Ineffective policies were carried out – grain
procurement and steel and iron production – while government officials focused on protecting
their careers by enforcing unrealistic goals which starved peasants to death.3
Amartya Sen, a Nobel Laureate argues, “in the terrible history of famines in the world, no
substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively
free press.”4 According to Sen, severe famine does not happen if a country is autonomous
(independent), fair and accountable (democratic), and encourages free exchange of ideas (free
press). Autonomous government has the power to allocate resources according to domestic
concerns, and democratic government has duty to accommodate societal concerns guided by the
rule of law. Relatively free press allows citizens to express their concerns freely and notifies
government with challenges in society.
The Great Leap Famine in China could also have been prevented if China at the time was
independent, democratic, with a relatively free press, as Sen suggested. The Great Leap Famine
was led by three key factors: Mao ignoring precautionary alarm suggested by the political elites;
Mao silencing intellectuals from suggesting alternative agricultural-scientific theories; and top
Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe 1958-62 (New York:
Walker & Company, 2010), 324, 333.
2
James Kai-sing Kung and Justin Yifu Lin, “The Causes of China’s Great Leap Famine, 1959-1961,” Economic
Development and Cultural Change 52, no.1 (2003): 67.
3
Ibid.
4
Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” Journal of Democracy 10, no.3 (1999): 3-17.
1
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leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were not informed about the villagers dying of
famine. These could have been prevented under the Sen’s conditions because democratic
institutionalization allows political elites to freely discuss policies, freedom of expression
encourages intellectuals to freely criticize scientific theories, and democratic election and mass
media coverage motivates citizens to freely address their concerns. In addition to Sen’s
argument, authoritarian government can also prevent substantial famine if the government is
autonomous, fair, accountable, and encourages free exchange of ideas such as China today.
What is the Great Leap Famine?
The casualties of the Great Leap Famine vary among scholars. Most of the estimates
were based on the 1984 Statistical Yearbook by the National Statistical Bureau, which provides
official figures on population, birth and death rates between 1950 to 1982.7 Peng Xizhi estimated
23 million, Judith Banister reached 30 million, Cao Shuji suggested 32.5million, Yang Jisheng
concluded 36 million, and Jung Chang proposed 38 million.8 However, a renowned historian
Frank Dikötter proposes at least 45 million causalities because population numbers in 1984
Statistical Yearbook is inflated. He argues that since 1964, overall population was systematically
inflated by more than one percent or in some counties as high as 2.2 percent because local cadres
wanted to receive greater rations and other goods.9
The severity of the famine is reflected upon testimonials from the survivors. Yu Wenhai,
a production team account in Huaibin County’s Fanghu Township, describes as follows:

Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe 1958-62 (New York:
Walker & Company, 2010), 324.
8
Ibid, 325.
9
Ibid, 333.
7
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It was not unusual for people to eat corpses. I myself did so at Yaozhuang. I had gone to
see the production team head Yao Denju, and in the production team office I smelled the
fragrance of cooked meat… Gao Hongwen of the Gaozhuang production team had three
children. When he went to build the railway at Guangminggang, his wife cooked up all three
children and ate them.10

The Great Famine was a consequence of the CCP’s socialist campaign Great Leap
Forward which lasted from 1958 to 1962. The Great Leap Forward was proposed to transform
China’s agrarian society into industrial and socialist society. The state abolished private property,
and citizens were encouraged to join communes where they collectively worked together to
produce agricultural output. Farmers kept minimal crops based on their family size while
majority of productions went to the state who used these agricultural products to fund industrial
sectors.11 In just three years of the movement, investment on industrial sectors doubled from 14.4
billion yuan in 1957 to 38.9 billion yuan in 1960.12 As a consequence, major relocation of people
from rural areas to the cities occurred, and by 1960, urban state-workers reached 31.24 million
out of 50.44 million state-workers in total.13
This rapid transition from agriculture to industry significantly damaged the Chinese
economy. People in the cities suffered from high inflation, and industries could not pay workers

10

Jisheng Yang, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; 2012),
41
11
Sue Williams, “A Century of Revolution. Part II: The Mao Years (1949-76),” Directed by Sue Williams (New
York: Zeitgest Films, 1994).
12
Nicholas R. Lardy, "The Chinese economy under stress, 1958–1965,” in The
People's Republic, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949–1965, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar and John
K. Fairbank (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 38-87.
13
Ibid, 368.
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due to increased labor cost.14 Meanwhile, people in the countryside suffered from reduced labor
but with higher demands in food productions to accommodate urban population.15 Although
collectivization and rapid urbanization may have played a role in the famine, more problematic
was that the state remained unresponsive to the society in need during this radical change. The
Great Leap Famine occurred because the dictatorial leader ignored alarms from his political
elites, promoted inappropriate agricultural policies without challenging scientific theories, and
leaders of the CCP was not informed about suffering citizens.
Mao ignores Political Elites
Mao ignored political elites who tried to fix the early failures of the Great Leap Famine
through severe persecution. During the early stages of the Great Leap Forward, the CCP political
elites tried to fix the ineffective state policy. After one year of policy implementation, many
provincial cadres started to dismantle the communal system because of its unproductivity.16
People lacked incentives to work hard in communes because everyone was paid equally
disregarding the effort they put in.17 In order to motivate workers, provincial party leaders
introduced household contracting system that allowed each workers take extra output if they
produced more than contracted amount.18 However, the gradual shift from unproductive
communes into motivating household contracting system was put to an end after the Lushan
Conference.

Sue Williams, “A Century of Revolution. Part II: The Mao Years (1949-76),” Directed by Sue Williams (New
York: Zeitgest Films, 1994).
15
Ibid.
16
Dali L.Yang, Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change Since the Great Leap
Famine (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 48-49.
17
Ibid, 50.
18
Ibid, 49.
14
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A British journalist, Jasper Becker, argues that the Lushan Conference was the best
chance to stop Mao and its ineffective policies.19 In July and August of 1959, Lushan mountain
at Jiangxi province, the CCP elites gathered to discuss the Great Leap Forward. During this
meeting, Defence Minister Peng Dehwai wrote a “letter of opinion,” handwritten with 10,000
characters, to Mao. The mood of Peng’s letter is depicted in the verse from Beijing Opera:

The millet is scattered over the ground.
The leaves of the sweet potato are withered.
The young and old have gone to smelt iron.
To harvest the grain there are children and old women.
How shall we get through the next year?
I shall agitate and speak out on behalf of the people.20

Peng advised Mao for systematic and sober assessment of the Great Leap Forward because the
Leap created conflicts between worker-peasant relationships and urban-rural developments.21
Peng further contended that the CCP, which had won their power with the sacrifices of peasants,
must be responsible for famine.22 Although Peng addressed genuine concern for the welfare of
Chinese people, dictatorial Mao was unwilling to listen to his friend’s advice. Mao argued that
the suffering is “nothing but the tuition fees that must be paid to gain experience…come back in
ten years and see whether we were correct.”24 Consequently, Mao branded Peng and Peng’s

Jasper Becker, Hungry Ghosts: China’s Secret Famine (London: John Murray, 1996), 87.
Ibid, 88.
21
Dali L.Yang, Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change Since the Great Leap
Famine (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 51.
22
Jasper Becker, Hungry Ghosts: China’s Secret Famine (London: John Murray, 1996), 88.
24
Ibid, 89.
19
20
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supporters as “right opportunists,” and began severe persecution.25 Mao’s persecution of Peng
who was his closest friend and hero of the Korean War, silenced other political elites from
further questioning Mao. Also, Mao was unwilling to accept different ideas from political elites
who advocated for household contracting system, which could have alleviated famine, and began
collective punishment with Peng.26 Inevitably, the household contracting system was suppressed
and commune system became more strictly enforced. Due to Mao’s unwillingness to listen to
political elites, China lost its chance to reverse the failing policy and silenced political elites from
challenging bad policies, which ultimately resulted in the Great Famine.
Mao promotes false Scientific theory
In prior to launching the Great Leap Forward, Mao persecuted many intellectuals and as a
result, unproductive scientific theories intensified the famine. In 1956, the CCP encouraged
citizens to express concerns during the Hundred Flowers Campaign. However, Mao shortly
reversed his stance because citizens were questioning the legitimacy of the single party
dictatorship. Between 1957 to 1959, the CCP led Anti-Rightist Movement to persecute
intellectuals who criticized against the government, and by 1958, three hundred thousand citizens
were labeled as “Rightist.”27 When the CCP launched the Great Leap Forward in 1958,
intellectuals were in fear of criticizing government policies. As a result, the unproductive
scientific theories Mao implemented were left unchallenged and contributed to the Great Leap
Famine. Three key scientific myths that played significant role in the Great Leap Famine were
close-planting, excessive use of fertilizer and backyard furnaces.

25

Dali L.Yang, Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change Since the Great Leap
Famine (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 52.
26
Ibid.
27
Qian Gang and David Bandurski, “Uneasy silences punctuate 60 th anniversary coverage,” China Media Project,
10 Sept. 2009, http://cmp.hku.hk/2009/09/10/1740/, accessed 28 Oct. 2016.
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Firstly, Mao promoted close planting based on the idea from a Soviet agronomist Trofim
Lysenko.28 Lysenko hypothesized that seeds of same class do not compete with each other if they
were densely planted, therefore, increasing overall productivity.29 However, his hypothesis
proved to be false for same family crops compete each other for growth.30 Increased competition
created inferior crops which decreased their grain production and enlarged their leaves for better
photosynthesis.31 Secondly, the use of excessive fertilizer was implemented because the increase
in green crops production level in 1957 coincided with the increase in fertilization rate.32
However, when used excessively, fertilizer decreased overall production because once past the
threshold, it dries out the leaves and even causes plants to die which is referred to as a fertilizer
burn.33 Thirdly, Mao believed installing furnaces in the backyard of every commune will allow
production of high quality steel out of scrap metal.34 However, the steels produced in backyard
furnaces were of low-quality that could not be used in industrial sectors. It only depleted
resources and tired out labor force without producing any valuable output. If intellectuals were
not persecuted, hence challenging Mao from implementing unproductive scientific theories, the
Great Leap Forward could not have been as catastrophic as it had been.
Mao uninformed of Village concerns

Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe 1958-62 (New York:
Walker & Company, 2010), 39.
29
Ibid.
30
Bunny Guiness, “Correct plant spacing for a fabulous border,” Telegraph, 30 Nov. 2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/gardening/6692693/Correct-plant-spacing-for-a-fabulous-border.html, accessed 1 Nov.
2016.
31
Ibid.
32
Chung-kuo, Nung-pao, “The Fertilizer Work Over the Past Decade,” Extracts from China Mainland Magazines,
no.187 (Oct. 2, 1959), 23.
33
Susan Jones, “Fertilizer Burn,” American Orchid Society 2008, http://www.aos.org/orchids/orchid-pestsdiseases/fertilizer-burn.aspx, accessed 1 Nov. 2016.
34
Zhi-Sui Li, The Private Life of Chairman Mao: the memoirs of Mao’s personal physician (New York: Random
House, 1994), 272-274, 278.
28
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During the Great Leap Famine, the villagers who were dying of famine could not address
their concerns to the leaders of the CCP because local officials silenced village petitions. The
CCP has been top-down unitary system where orders are passed down from top to bottom of the
system. However, the concerns from the bottom had to surpass many layers before reaching to
the top.35 When citizens addressed their concerns to local officials, these petitions were easily
diverted before escalating to senior officials.36 Also, when citizens petitioned directly to Beijing
through petition department, regional concerns were sent back to regional officers.37 These
structures combined with restricted freedom of press, limited citizens to address severity of
famine to the top political leaders of the CCP.
The lack of communication between the state and the society further resulted in
exploiting the villagers. Under the pressure from their superiors to produce higher agricultural
output, the regional officials inflated agricultural production. Instead of actual 5 tons, local
officials reported 10 tons, and local officials used false reports to calculate the amount of state’s
and peasants’ share in agricultural output.39 The consequence of false reporting was paid by the
peasants whose agricultural output was mostly taken by the state leaving lessor for themselves.
When peasants repelled against the predatory state, they were punished with violence. According
to Frank Dikötter, local cadres beat up local villagers, buried alive, thrown into pounds, forced to
labor in the middle of winter, and etc.40 Around six to eight percent of those who died during the

Sue Williams, “A Century of Revolution. Part II: The Mao Years (1949-76),” Directed by Sue Williams (New
York: Zeitgest Films, 1994).
36
Ibid.
37
Laura M. Luehrmann, “Facing Citizen Complaints in China, 1951-1996,” Asian Survey 43, no.5 (2003): 852.
39
Basil Ashton, Kenneth Hill, Alan Piazza and Robin Zeitz, “Famine in China, 1958-61,” Population and
Development Review 10, no.4 (1984): 621-622.
40
Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe 1958-62 (New York:
Walker & Company, 2010), 294-96.
35
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Great Leap Famine were tortured to death in regional level.41 The vicious cycle of state
exploiting peasants persisted because peasants could not address their concerns to anybody other
than the abusers, under the unitary system without relatively free press.
Amartya Sen and the Great Leap Famine
As Sen describes, if China at the time was independent and democratic, and had
relatively free press, the Great Leap Famine could have been prevented. The state would have
been more responsive to concerns from political elites, ideas from scientists, and concerns from
citizens. Both political elites and leaders could have freely discussed about the cost and benefits
of the policies and collectively come up with the best state policy. Also, unproductive scientific
theories would have been challenged by other intellectuals, preventing them from harming the
economy, and replaced by efficient theories. Furthermore, village concerns would have been
addressed to the political leaders through elections and mass media coverage.
First, if Sen’s conditions were met, Mao would not have been able to ignore political
elites who tried to reverse famine. Leaders in democracies are more responsive toward
alternative ideas because power is not centralized in one leader. The governmental power is
dispersed through institutionalization in judiciary, legislative, executive bodies where each body
check performances of one another. During the Great Leap Famine, Mao would not have been
able to persecute all the political elites who objected his policies because democratic
institutionalization limits leader’s power. Also, opposition party can freely question the leader’s
performance in democracies. If China were democratic, General Peng’s letter of opinion would
not have been ignored, and provincial party cadres would have been rewarded for increasing

Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe 1958-62 (New York:
Walker & Company, 2010), xiii.
41
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production output through household contracting system. Overall, Sen’s statement correctly
describes the Great Leap Famine because democratic institutionalization limits leaders’ power
and political opposition have freedom to object the leader which together could have prevented
China from the severe famine.
Second, if Sen’s conditions were met, the false and unproductive scientific theories
implemented by the CCP could have been challenged and prevented from causing famine.
Intellectuals in democracies are encouraged to openly debate over theories and their ideas are
shared through relatively free press. This open discussion is critical in science because scientific
theories are falsifiable. During the Great Leap Famine, scientific myths such as close planting,
excess fertilizer usage, and steel production at backyard furnaces could have been prevented if
these theories were open to discussion. The scientists could have been freely tested and debated
over practicalities of suggested theories. And based on the proposed solutions, the government,
could have used these ideas to fix false assumptions and implement most efficient scientific
strategies. Overall, Sen correctly describes the Great Leap Famine because democracy with
relatively free press would have encouraged intellectuals to openly discuss about the scientific
theories. Eventually these ideas could advise the state with most efficient strategies, while
preventing from having unproductive scientific theories which intensified famine.
Third, if Sen’s conditions were met, the villagers could have addressed severity of the
famine directly to the political leaders. In democracies, the state officials carry-out policies based
on the popular consensus and citizens have the power to elect state representatives who can
reflect their interest. Also, having relatively free press allows both citizens and the state to
acquire accurate information about the realities of each other and share concerns mutually.
During the Great Leap Famine, villagers would have been able to express their concerns to the
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CCP leaders through mass media, and local officials wouldn’t have reported the inflated figures
nor been able to beat the citizens to death. If democratic, citizens would have voting power as
their leverage against the authority, and local officials would have been responsive to citizens’
concern rather than trying to satisfy senior officials through inflated figures. Furthermore,
newspapers could have written about failures of the Great Leap Famine and reported about local
officials committing violence to village farmers. Overall, Sen is correct in a sense that if China
was democratic with relatively free press, citizens would have been able to express their
concerns through election and press while the government would have been motivated to
accommodate citizens’ concerns, ultimately preventing the Great Leap Famine. Eventually, the
idea of mutual dependence between the state and the society could have prevented having a
severe famine.
China Today: Authoritarian government that listens
Still authoritarian, the government of China now leads one of the largest economies in the
world without experiencing substantial famine since the Great Leap Famine. What has changed
from the Great Famine is that the CCP very responsive government which encourages limited
freedom of expression. 43 Over the past few decades, the CCP tried to incorporate fair and
accountable government with freedom of expression, implementing merit-based promotion,
village level democracy, rule of law, protest permissions, and less censored media. Of course,
these are not absolute freedom nor fairness because legitimacy of the CCP cannot be discussed
and corruption is broadly evident. However, the CCP has certainly evolved to be much more
adaptive to the significant challenges of the society than it was back in 1950s, and is now capable

43

Daniel A. Bell, The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the limits of Democracy (Princeton; Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2015).
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of even leading the global economy. Still authoritarian, Chinese government values free
expression of ideas and responds to the society as in democracy by implementing these ideas. In
short, not only independent and democratic with relatively free press as Sen suggested, but also
any form of government which values exchange of thoughts and is willing to responds to the
citizens can evade substantial famine.
Conclusion
Some scholars argue that famines occurred in democratic countries such as Bangladesh in
1974, Sudan in 1986-1988 and Ireland in 1945-1949. However, Burchi contends that
“Bangladesh was democratic and liberal in name only and South Sudan and Ireland was not
considered as parts of the United Kingdom respectively.”44 Although these countries may have
appeared as democratic, they were oppressed by their governments.
As Sen suggested, if China had independent and democratic government with relatively
free press in 1950s, the Great Leap Famine could have been prevented. During the Great Leap
Famine, Mao ignored political elites, silenced intellectuals, and was not informed about
villagers’ concerns, ultimately resulting in the catastrophic famine with millions of casualties.
The famine could have been prevented under the Sen’s conditions because democratic
institutionalization allows political elites to freely discuss policies, freedom of expression
encourages intellectuals to freely criticize scientific theories, and democratic election and mass
media coverage motivates citizens to freely address their concerns. However, when looking at
current Chinese government, not only democratic but also independent, fair, and accountable
authoritarian government which encourages free exchange of ideas could evade substantial
famine as well.

Francesco Burchi, “Democracy, institutions and famines in developing and emerging countries,” Canadian
Journal of Development Studies 32, no.1 (2011): 22.
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